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Intergroup conflict persist when and because individuals make
costly contributions to their group’s fighting capacity, but how
groups organize contributions into effective collective action re-
mains poorly understood. Here we distinguish between contribu-
tions aimed at subordinating out-groups (out-group aggression)
from those aimed at defending the in-group against possible out-
group aggression (in-group defense). We conducted two experi-
ments in which three-person aggressor groups confronted three-
person defender groups in a multi-round contest game (N=276; 92
aggressor-defender contests). Individuals received an endowment
from which they could contribute to their group’s fighting capac-
ity. Contributions were always wasted, but when the aggressor
group’s fighting capacity exceeded that of their defender group,
the aggressor group acquired the defender group’s remaining
resources (otherwise, individuals on both sides were left with
the remainders of their endowment). In-group defense appeared
stronger and better coordinated than out-group aggression, and
defender groups survived roughly 70% of the attacks. This low
success-rate for aggressor groups mirrored that of group-hunting
predators such as wolves and chimpanzees (N=1,382 cases), hos-
tile takeovers in industry (N=1,637 cases) and interstate conflicts
(N=2,586). Furthermore, whereas peer punishment increased out-
group aggression more than in-group defense without affecting
success-rates (Exp. 1), sequential (versus simultaneous) decision-
making increased coordination of collective action for out-group
aggression, doubling the aggressor’s success-rate (Exp. 2). The
relatively high success rate of in-group defense suggests that evo-
lutionary and cultural pressures may have favored capacities for
cooperation and coordination when the group goal is to defend,
rather than to expand, dominate, and exploit.
competition | parochial altruism | coordination | collective action |
intergroup relations
Human history is marked by intergroup conflict. From tribal
warfare in the Holocene to Viking raids in medieval times, to
terrorist attacks in current times, small groups of often no more
than a handful of individuals organize for collective violence and
aggression. Individuals within such groups contribute, at some-
times exceedingly high personal cost, to their group’s capacity to
fight other groups [1—5]. And in doing so, individuals and their
groups waste resources and people, and create imprints on col-
lective memories that affect intergroup relations for generations
to come [6—10].
Given the risk of injury and death, and the collective wasteful-
ness of intergroup conflict, it may seem puzzling that people self-
sacrifice and make costly contributions to their group’s fighting
capacity. However, by contributing to intergroup aggression in-
dividuals enable their groups to subordinate rivaling out-groups
and absorb its resources [3,4], something from which individual
group members benefits too. Indeed, groups that most effectively
elicit contributions from its members are most likely to be victori-
ous and, perhaps, intergroup competition and conflict pressures
individuals to contribute to intergroup violence [1,3,5,11,12] and
its supporting institutions [8,9,13,14].
That intergroup conflict elicits self-sacrificial contributions
to one’s group’s fighting capacity has been robustly revealed
in experiments using N-person (intergroup) prisoner’s dilemma
[4,5,15—17] or price-contest games [18—21]. What cannot be
derived from these setups, however, is whether individuals self-
sacrifice to defend their in-group against out-group aggression,
to aggressively exploit and subordinate the out-group, or because
of some combination of both reasons [5,9,10,22,23]. In addition,
it is unclear how the willingness to defend the in-group relates
to the willingness to aggress out-groups. These issues are non-
trivial because tendencies for in-group defense and out-group
aggression are often differentially dispersed between opposing
groups. From group-hunting by lions, wolves, or killer whales
[24,25], to groups of chimpanzee raiding on their neighbors [11],
to hostile take-overs in the marketplace [26] and territorial con-
flicts within and between nation states [27], intergroup conflict
is often a clash between the antagonist’s out-group aggression
and the opponent’s in-group defense [23,28]. Second, in-group
defense and out-group aggression appear to have distinct neu-
robiological origins [5,29—31] and may thus recruit different
within-group dynamics [4,28]. Whereas self-defense is impulsive
and relies on brain structures involved in threat signaling and
emotion regulation, offensive aggression is more instrumental
and conditioned by executive control [29—31]. Third, the moti-
vation to avoid loss is stronger than the search for gain [32,33],
suggesting that individuals more readily contribute to defensive
rather than offensive aggression. Finally, self-sacrifice in combat
Significance
Across a range of domains—group-hunting predators, labora-
tory groups, companies and nation states—we find that out-
group aggression is less successful because it is more difficult
to coordinate than in-group defense. This finding explains why
appeals for defending the in-group may be more persuasive
than appeals to aggress a rivalling out-group, and suggests
that (third) parties seeking to regulate intergroup conflict
should, in addition to reducing willingness to contribute to
one’s group’s fighting capacity, undermine arrangements for
coordinating out-group aggression—like leadership, commu-
nication, and infrastructure.











































































































































Fig. 1. Peer punishment in intergroup aggressor-defender conflict (displayed
Mean±1SE); Connectors indicate difference at p≤0.05. (A) Contributions
(range 0—20). (B) Within-group variance (dispersion). (C) Number of non-
contributors per group across conflict episodes (range 0—5); (D) Aggressor
success (range 0–5).
is publicly rewarded more (e.g., with a Medal of Honor) when
it served in-group defense rather than out-group aggression [34].
Accordingly, in-group defense may emerge more spontaneously,
and individuals may be more intrinsically motivated to contribute
to in-group defense than to out-group aggression.
If in-group defense is indeed more intrinsically motivating
and spontaneous, groups preparing for in-group defense should
face fewer non-contributors than groups preparing for out-group
aggression. Aggressor groups should thus have higher within-
group dispersion in contributions and may have greater difficulty
organizing adequate out-group aggression. This collective action
problem in aggressor groups may emerge because of motivation
failure—individuals are less willing to contribute to out-group
aggression than to in-group defense—or it may be the result of
poor coordination—it is more difficult to coordinate and align
individual contributions to effectively aggress a rivaling group,
than it is to raise proper in-group defense.
We examined these possibilities, and their consequences for
conflict trajectories and resolution by pitting out-group aggres-
sion against in-group defense. Because existing models of inter-
group conflict such as N-person prisoners’ dilemmas and inter-
group contest games are ill-fitted to distinguish between out-
group aggression and in-group defense, we developed a novel
intergroup aggressor-defender conflict (IADC) game. Six indi-
viduals randomly divided in 3-person aggressor and defender
groups each received 20 Experimental Euros from which they
could contribute g (0≤gi≤20) to their group’s pool C (0≤C≤60).
Individual contributions to the pool were wasted, but when
Caggressor>Cdefender, the aggressor won the remaining resources of
the defenders (60–Cdefender), which was divided equally among
Fig. 2. Sequential decision-making in intergroup aggressor-defender conflict
(displayed Mean±1SE); Connectors indicate difference at p≤0.05. (A) Contri-
butions (range 0—20). (B) Within-group variance (dispersion). (C) Number
of non-contributors per group across conflict episodes (range 0—5). (D)
Aggressor success (range 0–5).
Fig. 3. Coordination in intergroup aggressor-defender conflict (displayed
Mean intraclass-correlation±1SE); Connectors indicate difference at p≤0.05.
(A) Change from baseline when punishment or sequential decision-making
is introduced. (B) Aggressor success as a function of aggressor’s within-group
coordination.
aggressor group members and added to their remaining endow-
ments (20-gi). Defenders thus earned 0 when aggressors won.
However, when Caggressor ≤ Cdefender, defenders survived, and indi-
viduals on both sides kept their (20-gi). Thus, individual contri-
butions in aggressor (defender) groups reflect out-group aggres-
sion (in-group defense). We used the game to (i) test whether
individual contributions to out-group aggression are weaker than











































































































































Fig. 4. Aggressor-defender success-rates. (A) per-
centage of successful attacks by group-hunting ani-
mals (and their prey). Black (grey) bars are predator
(prey). Numbers in bars are observed cases; bracketed
numbers in Y-axis are source references. (B) Nash-
estimate for aggressor’s success in the IADC (Nash),
observed aggressor success in baseline treatments of
Experiment 1 and 2 (IADC-base), punishment (IADC-
pun) and sequential decision-making (IADC-seq), and
sample-size weighted average success-rate in group
hunting predators (GHP) (displayed percentage±1SE);
connectors indicate difference at p≤0.05.
aggressor’s success in subordinating its defender, and (iii) deter-
mine whether possible failures to subordinate defender groups
are due to a lack of motivation to contribute to out-group ag-
gression and/or to a failure to align and coordinate individual
contributions to out-group aggression.
Method Summary
The IADC was implemented in two experiments. In Exp.
1, N=144 subjects participated (106 female; Median age=21).
In Exp. 2, N=132 subjects participated (78 females; Median
age=22). In each experiment, one session involved six subjects di-
vided at random in a 3-person aggressor and a 3-person defender
group; Exp. 1 thus has 144/6=24 IADC sessions and Exp. 2 had
132/6=22 IADC sessions. In both experiments, the six individuals
invited for one IADC session were randomly assigned to one of
two laboratory rooms and one of three individual cubicles within
that room. Subjects were unaware of who else was in either labo-
ratory room and, once seated, signed informed consent and read
instructions for the IADC [Materials and Method]. Thereafter,
subjects indicated their contribution g (0≤gi≤20) to their group’s
pool C, were informed about the total contribution their group
made to C (0≤C≤60), the total contribution C made by the other
group, and the resulting earnings to the members of their own
group, themselves included. This concluded one IADC episode.
In total, subjects engaged in one block of five baseline episodes,
and one block of five treatment episodes (i.e., allowing for peer
punishment in Exp. 1; and for sequential decision-making in Exp.
2; further detail below). Order in which blocks were presented
was counter-balanced and found not to qualify conclusions drawn
below.
Investments were always wasted and, from a social welfare
perspective, it thus is optimal for all individuals on both sides
not to contribute anything. This contrasts with both individual
and group welfare considerations. Specifically, the IADC has
mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in which individuals contribute to
out-group aggression (in-group defense) on average 10.15 (9.77),
and aggressors (defenders) win (survive) 32.45% (67.55%) of the
episodes [35; Materials and Methods]. We examined these esti-
mates against the data from the five baseline episodes of the two
experiments combined (N=276 individuals in 46 IADCs). Out-
group aggression fell below (M=-2.401, SE=0.567) and in-group
defense exceeded (M=0.858, SE=0.400) the Nash-equilibrium
(t[45]= -9.231, p≤0.001 and t[45]=2.146, p=0.037); Aggressors
defeated defenders in 22.5% of their attacks, which is below the
Nash success-rate (M=-0.679, SE=0.154; t[45]=-4.405, p≤0.001).
Experiment 1
As noted, a first possible explanation for the relatively low
success-rate for out-group aggression is a relative low willingness
to contribute to the aggressor’s fighting capacity. If true, sanc-
tioning arrangements that are known to increase contributions
to public goods should (i) increase contributions more in aggres-
sor groups than in defender groups (in which contributions are
already high). If sanctions indeed affect contributions especially
in aggressor groups, and if relatively low willingness to invest is
a cause for the aggressor’s low success-rate, sanctions also and
therefore may (ii) increase the aggressor group’s success-rate.
One sanctioning arrangement that can increase costly contri-
butions is peer punishment. Individuals, after they see their group
members’ contributions, can execute a punishment that is costly
to themselves but more costly to the punished group member(s)
[13,19,36—39]. Experiments have shown that individuals punish
to motivate others to contribute more, that individuals respond
to (the threat of) punishment by increasing subsequent contribu-
tions in public good provision [36—39] and intergroup contests
[13,18,19]. Accordingly, Exp. 1 examinedwhether relative to base-
line episodes in which peer punishment was absent, (i) the pres-
ence of peer punishment increased contributions to the group’s
fighting capacity especially in aggressor groups and (ii) whether
such relative increase in out-group aggression translates in higher
success-rates for aggressor groups. The experiment involved five
baseline episodes and five consecutive episodes in which individu-
als could assign costly punishment within groups. In episodes with
peer punishment each player i received 10 “decrement points” and
could assign s (0≤si;j≤5) to any other player j in their group, with
each point assigned reducing 1 from the punisher i’s EE, and 3
from the punished player j’s EE (punishment across groups was
not possible). As in baseline episodes resulting earnings were then
shown, which ended the episode (on each round, we randomly
reshuffled the letter by which group members were identified, so
that within the group [expecting] punishment was decoupled from
reputation and reciprocity considerations).
Data were aggregated to the group-level and submitted to
a 2(role: aggressor/defender) x 2(punishment: present/absent)
ANOVA. Contributions to in-group defense were higher than
to out-group aggression (F[1,23]=41.97, p=0.0001). Impor-
tantly, punishment increased contributions to out-group ag-
gression (F[1,23]=4.49, p=0.046) but not to in-group defense
(F[1,23]=1.18, p=0.289) (Fig 1A). Reflecting less coordination
in aggressor groups, we observed that within-group dispersion
in a conflict episode was larger for out-group aggression than
for in-group defense, F[1,23]=14.52, p=0.001; dispersion was
not influenced by punishment (Fig 1B; role x punishment:
F[1,23]=1.26, p=0.276). Zooming in on non-contributors (indi-
viduals who invested zero, within groups and across episodes),
ANOVA revealed effects for role, F[1,23]=21.22, p=0.001, pun-
ishment, F[1,23]=9.25, p=9.25, p=0.006, and role x punishment,











































































































































(very low) number of people not contributing to in-group defense,
but reduced the higher number of people not contributing to
out-group aggression from 23% to 13%. Thus, peer punishment
increased out-group aggression more than in-group defense. This
notwithstanding, punishment failed to increase success: aggressor
groups only won 23.75% of all episodes, a success-rate not condi-
tioned by punishment (F[1,23]≤0.35, all p≥0.588) (Fig 1D).
In Exp. 1 peer punishment increased contributions more
in aggressor than defender groups, but the increased fighting
capacity in aggressor groups did not increase success (and re-
duced individual wealth; Materials and Methods). The relatively
low success-rate for out-group aggression cannot be simply el-
evated by increasing the contributions. Exp. 2 targeted the al-
ternative possibility, that out-group aggression fails because of
poor coordination. If true, arrangements that enable groups
to align its members’ contributions into coordinated fighting
should be particularly effective in aggressor groups, and increase
their success-rate. One such arrangement is sequential decision-
making [52.40,41], which has been shown to solve collective action
problems in public goods provision [40—43]. In such a procedure,
one individual moves first, allowing the rest of the group to adapt
and follow the first-mover’s lead [40,41,43]. It is seen in group-
hunting carnivores like wolves—upon encircling their prey, the
group waits until the most senior wolf leads by launching the
first attack [25,44]—and has been identified as a minimal form
of leadership with voluntary followers [45,46].
Experiment 2
In addition to the five baseline (simultaneous decision-
making) episodes, Exp. 2 included five episodes of sequential
decision-making: one member in each group was randomly se-
lected to move first, then the randomly selected second player
made its decision, and then the remaining third player made its
decision [43]. Each decision was shown to the other two group
members. The episode ended with back-reporting earnings.
Data were submitted to a 2(role: aggressor/defender) x
2(decision-making procedure: simultaneous/sequential) mixed-
model ANOVA. Contributions to in-group defense were higher
than to out-group aggression (F[1,21]=29.30, p≤0.001) and not
affected by decision-making procedure (F[1,21]=0.07, p=0.799)
or the role x procedure interaction (F[1,21]=2.71, p=0.115) (Fig
2A). As in Experiment 1, dispersion was larger for out-group
aggression than for in-group defense, F[1,21]=5.42, p=0.030.
However, a role x procedure interaction (F[1,21]=5.04, p=0.036)
showed that sequential decision-making reduced within-episode
dispersion for out-group aggression but not for in-group defense
(Fig 2B). Zooming in on non-contributors, ANOVA revealed
effects for role, F[1,21]=17.52, p≤0.001 and role x procedure
(F[1,21]=6.36, p=0.020 (Fig 2C). Sequential decision-making did
not affect the (low) number of people not contributing to in-
group defense; in aggressor groups, however, sequential decision-
making reduced the (higher) number of people not contributing
to out-group aggression from 31% to 23%. Crucially, sequential
decision-making almost doubled aggressor’s success, from 20%
under simultaneous decision-making to 35% under sequential
decision-making (F[1,21]=6.05, p=0.023)(Fig 2D).
Conclusions and Discussion
The experiments together showed that (i) individual contri-
butions to out-group aggression are weaker than those to in-
group defense, and (ii) aggressor groups frequently fail to win the
conflict, and waste individual resources on ineffective out-group
aggression. This failure is (iii) unlikely to be caused by a lack of
motivation to contribute to out-group aggression: Experiment 1
showed that peer punishment motivated individuals to contribute
more to out-group aggression (but not to in-group defense)
yet such higher contributions did not translate into increased
success-rate for out-group aggression, leading to more wasted
resources and lower overall welfare. Experiment 2 suggested that
the relatively low success-rate for aggressor groups can be (iv)
attributed to a failure to align and coordinate individual contri-
butions to out-group aggression into effective collective action.
This possibility was tested directly by computing, as an index
of coordination, the within-episode intra-class correlation for
contributions [47; Materials and Methods]. Relative to baseline,
sequential decision-making increased coordination in aggressor
groups more than in defender groups (Fig 3A). As shown also, se-
quential decision-making improved coordination more than peer
punishment, and coordination predicted success for out-group
aggression (r=0.30, t[90] = 2.94, p=0.004, Fig 3B). It follows
that the aggressor group’s failure to subordinate its defender is
due to the aggressor’s tougher task at coordinating within-group
contributions into effective out-group aggression.
Willingness to contribute, coordinated collective action, and
aggressor success-rates, were revealed in an intergroup conflict
that modeled a clashing of out-group aggression by one antago-
nist, and in-group defense by its opponent. Real world analogies
are group-hunting carnivores facing prey aggressively defend-
ing themselves, boards of directors attempting and warding-off
hostile-takeover, tribal raiding and warfare, and most interstate
disputes. For example, of the 2,209 documented interstate con-
flicts since the Congress of Vienna in 1816 [27,48,49], 67% were
between aggressors seeking territorial or policy change in states
that tried to defend the status quo [Materials and Methods].
Similar to our model, these aggressor-defender conflicts typi-
cally see aggressor success-rate around 35%—aggressor states
win less than 30% of the interstate conflicts they are involved
in, and industry boards pushing for hostile take-over are suc-
cessful only 40% of the time (Fig 4A)[50—52; Materials and
Methods]. Even hunting groups of wolves, lions, jackal, or killer
whales are successful once in every three attempts (33%; Fig 4B)
[24,44,53—59;Materials and Methods].
The finding that, across species and types of intergroup con-
flict, aggressors succeed 1/3 of the time on average may be due
to the need to coordinate collective action into a costly attack
sometimes, but not all the time. Indeed, aggressing all the time is
energetically impossible. Also, it would set a permanent high level
of in-group defense, and prohibit defender groups from being
lured into an illusionary state of safety, with lowered defense
and concomitant higher probability of successful capture [31].
To trump in-group defense, aggressors need to launch surprise
attacks. Next to a willingness to sacrifice private resources, this
requires careful within-group coordination.
Our conclusions derive, in part, from two laboratory exper-
iments and may be limited to the specific parameters used to
design the Intergroup Aggressor-Defender Conflict. In many in-
tergroup conflicts, including those analyzed here, a single failure
to defend adequately will result in the death for the prey yet
following a failure to capture, a predator can find an alternative
prey. As noted, however, attacking is very costly and when a
predator repeatedly fails on consecutive attacks, it dies just like
the prey that fails to adequately defend. Similarly, a company
attempting but failing a hostile take-over may be weakened to the
extent that bankruptcy cannot be avoided. Thus, whereas in the
current experiments both aggressor and defender groups received
a full reset of their endowments on each new round, oftentimes
such reset can be less abundant, substantially delayed, and the
cost of unsuccessful attack may be (much) higher than in our
experiments. Whether these deter individuals from contributing
to out-group aggression, or stimulate contributions and facilitate
coordination of collective action, remains an issue for further
research.
It has been argued that histories of intergroup conflict and
competition may have acted as selection pressures favoring self-
sacrificial contributions to one’s group’s fighting capacity, and











































































































































technologies that enable groups to coordinate their members’ ac-
tivities and contributions [3,14]. Current findings align with these
possibilities. However, the relatively high success rate of in-group
defense suggests that evolutionary and cultural pressures may
have favored capacities for cooperation and coordination when
the group goal is to defend, rather than to expand, dominate, and
exploit.
Materials and Methods
Experiments were approved by the University of Amsterdam Psychology
Research Ethics Board (files 2014-WOP-3451 and 2015-WOP-4531); subjects
provided written informed consent prior to the experiment, and were
debriefed. Subjects were recruited on the University campus through an on-
line recruiting web-site, for a study announced as “human decision making
in groups.” The experimental instructions used neutral language throughout
(e.g., groups were referred to as Group A and B, contributions were labelled
investments, and terms like in-group defense and out-group aggressionwere
avoided). All subjects passed a comprehension check that consisted of two
complete scenarios for one episode of the IADC from the perspective of
their role, with their group winning and losing the episode, respectively.
Experiments involved no deception and subjects received €10 show-up fee
andM=€3.62 (range 0—€10) for their performance. Personal earnings in both
experiments were based on the average of two randomly selected baseline
episodes and two punishment (Exp. 1) or sequential decision-making (Exp. 2)
episodes, provided that earnings would not drop below the €10 show-up fee
and that both groups were rewarded equally (per local policies within our
research laboratories). To preserve confidentiality, earnings were calculated
afterwards and transferred to the subject’s bank account.
Game-theoretic Analysis. Game-theoretic equilibria for the IADC
game–with two three-person groups, each member assumed to have risk-
neutral preferences and having a discretionary resource to invest from–were
numerically estimated using a modified version of an algorithm developed
by [35] in Matlab. The resulting unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
assigns the same strategy for players within the same group. For each pure
strategy (range 0–20), the probabilities for investing in out-group aggression
(in-group defense) are p(0) = 0.5322 (0.0105); p(1) = 0.0876 (0.5615); p(2) =
0.045 (0.1050); p(3) = 0.0321 (0.0249); p(4) = 0.0068 (0.0241); p(5) = 0.0067
(0.0198); p(6) = 0.0095 (0.0894); p(7) = 0.0283 (0.0844); p(8) = 0.1125 (0.0087);
p(9) = 0.0152 (0.0076); p(10) = 0.0066 (0.0067); p(11) = 0.0054 (0.0051); p(12)
= 0.0046 (0.0044); p(13) = 0.0054 (0.0050); p(14) = 0.0134 (0.0064); p(15) =
0.0594 (0.0080); p(16) = 0.0147 (0.0089); p(17) = 0.0043 (0.0073); p(18) =
0.0024 (0.0053); p(19) = 0.0019 (0.0040); and p(20) = 0.0015 (0.0031). Thus,
assuming common belief in rationality in individual group members, out-
group aggression (in-group defense) is expected to average 10.15 (9.77), and
aggressors (defenders) should win (survive) 32.45% (67.55%) of the episodes.
An alternative approach is to treat groups as single agents, with each
group having risk-neutral preferences and being endowed with 20 x 3 = 60
resources. The strategies played in equilibrium imply that both groups only
assign positive probabilities to strategies between 0 and 38 [viz. 30]. This
yields expected out-group aggression (in-group defense) of 5.41 (7.25), and
aggressors (defenders) should win (survive) 37.51% (62.49%) of the episodes.
These estimates differ more from observed contributions and success-rates
than those predicted by the admittedly more realistic individual-level equi-
libria.
Indexing Within-group Coordination. The ICC(2) describes how strongly
individuals in the same group resemble each other. Unlike most other
correlation measures it operates on data structured as groups, rather than
data structured as paired observations. The index can be used to assess the
amount of statistical interdependence within a particular social system (e.g.,
work-team) underlying individual-level data (e.g., individual ratings of group
cohesion). Higher ICC(2) values reflect the level of consensus + consistency
one would expect if an individual contributor was randomly selected from
his or her group and within a particular decision round, and his or her
scores were compared to the mean score (i.e., estimated true score) obtained
from this group [47]. Thus, higher ICC(2) values in essence mean that group
members are more similar to each other in the contributions made to their
group’s fighting capacity.
Additional Results. In both Experiments we explored the influence of
conflict episode in 2(role) x 2(treatment) x 5(episode) ANOVAs. In Exp. 1, we
found no effects involving episode, all Fs<1.28, all ps>0.25. In Exp. 2we found
that the role x sequence effect on dispersion (Fig 2B) was qualified by a role
x sequence x episode effect, F(4,18)=4.736, p=0.009. The lower dispersion in
aggressor groups under sequential decision-making disappeared in the final
episode, which may reflect an end-game effect. We suggest that our main
conclusions hold across conflict episodes.
In Exp. 1 we looked at targets of punishment. We identified weak con-
tributors (g≤5) receiving punishment (“weak contributors punished”) or not
(“weak contributors not punished”), and strong contributors (g≥15) receiving
punishment (“strong contributors punished”) or not (“strong contributors
not punished”). A 2(role) x 2(contributor type: weak/strong) x 2(contributor
type punished: yes/no) within-session ANOVA showed that in aggressor
groups, more weak than strong contributors were punished (M=3.0 vs.
M=1.2; F[1,23]=10.33, p=0.005), whereas in defender groups, both typeswere
equally unlikely to receive punishment (M=1.10 vs. M=1.24; F[1,23]=0.02,
p=0.890). Thus, especially aggressor groups biased punishment towards their
weak contributors.
In both Experiments we examined individual wealth as a function of
treatment and role. Intergroup conflict is wasteful and the experimental
game mirrored this. Investments were always wasted, and individuals in
defender (aggressor) groups could earn between 0 and 20 (0 and 40). Despite
these differences in stakes, however, individuals in aggressor (defender)
groups lost about 30% (35%) of their individual wealth (final wealth/20EE).
In Experiment 1 we observed effects for role (F[1,22]=289.53, p≤0.0001,
and punishment (F[1,22]=3.32, p=0.081 (marginal). Individuals in aggressor
groups experienced a greater loss in wealth under punishment (M=14.206
versus M=15.317), as did individuals in defender groups (M=7.111 versus
M=7.633). These numbers are conservative estimates because they ignore
wealth reductions due to punishing others and being punished. In Exp. 2 we
found that wealth was affected by both role (F[1,21]=254.13, p≤0.001), and
role x decision-making procedure (F[1,21]=7.91, p=0.010): Under sequential
decision-making, individuals in aggressor groups saw less wealth reduction
than in baseline conditions (M=14.803. SE=0.609 vs. 13.469, SE=0.806); indi-
viduals in defender groups lost more under sequential decision-making (M =
6.712, SE = 0.654 vs. M = 5.724, SE = 0.649) which is a direct consequence of
their aggressors becoming more effective under sequential decision-making
(see Fig 2D). Thus, in aggressor groups the introduction of peer punishment
reduced, and sequential decision-making increased wealth.
Because individuals were randomly assigned to groups we had all-
male, all-female and mixed gender groups. A meta-analysis [16] found
no significant differences between male and female participants in costly
contributions to in-group efficiency, or out-group competitiveness. This we
replicate here: Across current experiments, correlations between group-
level co tributions, within-group dispersion, and success-rate for in-group
defense and out-group aggression on the one hand, and the number of
males in aggressor and defender groups on the other ranged between -0.251
and +0.112, with all ps≥0.10. Current findings and conclusions generalize
across gender and group composition, and we suggest that contributing to
the group’s fighting capacity may not be sex-specific.
Archival Analyses: Interstate conflict, hostile take-overs, and group-
hunting predators. The Correlates of War project provides descriptive infor-
mation on 2,586 interstate (militarized) conflicts since the Congress of Vienna
in 1816 [48,49]. We integrated distinct datasets (MIDA and MIDB; Versions
4.01; both downloaded July 15, 2014 from www.correlatesofwar.org) to
determine the structure of the interstate conflict as being symmetrical
(0=between two aggressor states, or between two defender states) or
asymmetrical (1=between an aggressor and a defender state). States are
“revisionist” (aggressor) when they desire change in territory, policy, or gov-
ernment in their antagonist; “non-revisionists” (defenders) in contrast, seek
to preserve and maintain the status quo with regard to territory, policy, or
government [48,49]. Exactly two-third (67%) was between an aggressor and
a defender state, and 33% was symmetrical (χ2[1,2209]=494.45, p≤0.0001).
The datasets also contained coding for the outcome of these aggressor-
defender disputes: aggressors were unsuccessful in 1,057 disputes (985 ended
in a stalemate, and 72 ending in victory to the defender). Aggressors were
relatively victorious in 239 disputes, reaching either a compromise (76), or a
clear victory (163). Two-hundred sixty cases were coded “unclear.” Excluding
these gives a conservative estimate of aggressor success of 18%; coding
“unclear” as aggressor success gives a liberal 38% – the point estimate thus
being 28% (see also Fig 4B).
Following a survey of the literature on hostile takeover [26] we retained
three sources that provided sufficient statistical detail on the number of
hostile take-overs that were, or were not successful. Takeover attempts
were defined as hostile when the target firm (defender) officially rejects an
offer but the acquirer (aggressor) persists with the takeover [26], and thus
represent a clashing of out-group aggression and in-group defense (e.g.,
the use of “poison pills”). Success was coded as take-over completed (1) or
abandoned (0). Mitchell and Mulherin [51] analyzed takeover activity by
major industrial corporations between 1982–1989. Takeover attempts con-
sidered friendly were successful in 268 out of 286 documented cases (93.7%);
Takeover attempts considered hostile were successful in 85 out of the 243
documented cases (35%). Schneper and Guillen [50] collected data on 37
countries between 1988—1998 and detected 952 hostile takeover attempts,
of which 336 were coded as successful (35%). Secondary analyses on data
fromMuehlfeld, Sahib, and van Witteloostuijn [52], who examined takeover
activity in the newspaper industry between 1981 and 2000, revealed that
3,173 of the 3,615 cases were coded friendly and 442 as hostile. Completion
rate was 76% for friendly, and 53% for hostile takeovers (235/442). This
figure is higher than those reported in [50,51], possibly because these other
sources considered mostly publicly listed companies with often sophisticated
measures against hostile take-overs (e.g., “poison pills”). This may be less so
in smaller companies present in the data from [52] and the lack of defense
mechanisms may explain the higher success-rate seen for hostile take-overs.
Notwithstanding the variability in years of study, type of industry, and geo-
political regions, the sample-size weighted success-rate for hostile takeovers











































































































































Success-rates for group-hunting predators were obtained by (i) tracking
citations to [24,25], (ii) surveyingWeb of Science (Nov. 2015) using the search
terms “group” (or “collective”) AND “hunting” (or “predation;” “predators;”
“carnivores”) AND “success” (or “kills;” “attacks;” “killings”, “prey capture”) and
(iii) tracking citations to articles obtained under (i) and (ii). Included in
the analysis here are reports focusing on mammalian predators with prey
fighting back as the dominant response (rather than fleeing), and providing
sufficient statistical detail to obtain a reliable estimate of predator success.
Retained are [44,53—59].
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